Kenya's economic policy with respect to the world coffee market by Koester, Ulrich
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
(832) 
(a) UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
(b/) Institute for Development Studies 
Working papers 
KENYA'S ECONOMIC POLICY WITH RtSPECT 
TO THE WORLD COFFEE MARKET 
By 
U. Koester 
WORKING PAPER NO. 333 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
• UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, KENYA 
LIBRARY 
1 0 FEB 2011 
INSTITUTE OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
April 1S78 
View.s expressed in this papar are those of the author. They should not be 
interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for Development Studies 
or of the University of Nairobi. 
Ra/ izzss* 
IDS 
095410 
- 4 - IDS/WP 333 
KENYA'S ECOHOMIC POLICY WITH RESPECT 
TO THE WORLD COFFEE MARKET 
By 
U. Koester 
AESTRACT 
Expor't earnings from coffee accounted for 22 to 55 per cent of total 
export earnings for the period 1964-1977 in Kenya. Henee coffee prices determine 
Kenya's terms of trade and available domestic resources to a very large extent. 
In 1977, domestic income increased as much as 13.5 per cent due to the coffee 
price boom. 
Coffee prices are not only an important determinant of domestic 
income changes, but also of the balance of payments. It is estimated that 
a one per cent change in coffee erices will induce a devaluation effect whicu 
is equal to a 0.7 r>ér cent change in the exchange- v-e. These figures indicate 
the crucial importance of the vorld coffee market for the Kenyan economy and 
show Kenya's interest in accurate predictions of worid coffee prices. It is 
pointed out, however, that reliable forecasts are not at hand, as market 
conditions are not onlv influenced by economic. factors but also by weather 
conditions and the storage policy of the main coffee exporters and importers. 
International agreements may be seen as a device to stabilise the 
volatile world coffee market. Even if it is assumed that Kenya is a low-cost 
producer, the present internaticnal coffee quota system is favourable from 
Kenya's noint of view. However, Kenya's situation could be improved still 
further if international tradable certificates for quotas viere to be intro-
duced. 
An international buffer stock for coffee which has been under 
dis cussion since the middle of 1977 is penerally favourable to Kenya. However, 
much depends on the level of national contributions to the funds. A proposal 
for calculating the magnitude of national contributions is worked out in this 
paper. It is questionable whether an international buffer stock for coffee 
will come into operation in the near future, but the Stabex system will be 
very favourable for Kenya in the short run. 
Kenya's past coffee market'policy did not promote the country's 
growth, income distribution, monetary stability or employment objectives as 
fully as possible. Future coffee market policy would be much more efficient 
if a variable exoort tax were introduced to compénsate for the difference 
between the world market price and the domestic Drice. The domestic price 
would be set at a level just to guarantee the fulfilment of the national 
quota. 
/ 
KENYA'S ECONOMIC POLICY WITH RESPECT 
TO THE WORLD COFFEE MARKET 
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely known that the world coffee market is extremely volatile 
and has severe effects on the Kenya economy. The aim of this paper is to give 
an idea of some quantified effects on the Kenyan economy which arise from 
changes on the world coffee market. After this, a short analysis of the 
causes of world coffee market fluctuations will be presented, as well as 
future prospects for the market.- Third, policy strategies will be evaluated, 
starting with the international sphere and including domestic policy activities. 
Finally. an appraisal of Kenya(s coffee marketing policy of the past few years 
will help to formúlate policy recommendations for the future. 
n 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORLD COFFEE MARKET FOR THE KENYAN ECONOMY 
The importance of coffee production for the Kenyan economy may be 
highlighted by some global figures. According to Táble 1, export earnings 
from coffee accounted for 22 to 55 per cent of total export earnings for the 
period 1964- - 1977. This makes coffee the dominant Kenyan export product. 
Annual changes in coffee export earnings are positive or negative due to changes 
in world market prices and domestic supply fluctuations, and the state of the 
coffee market is crucial for the domestic balance of payments situation as well 
as terms of trade and. available domestic resources Roth world prices and 
domestic supply effects will be analysed in more detail in this paper. 
It is obvious from the figures presented in Table 1 that coffee 
prices determine the terms of trade (export price-index divided by import 
price-index) to a large extent, due to the high share of total export earnings 
accounted for by coffee export earnings. However, this is not only an effect 
which shows up in national statistics, but it also has severe implications for 
available domestic. res curcas and for domestic welfare. Indeed, it can easily 
be shown that changes in the GDP at constant prices (growth rate) is a very 
cuestionable welfare indicator if the terms of trade varv considerably over 
time. To show this, we start with the following equation:-
(1) y = P q - P £ q£ + Pj q z 
where y = income available 
? = nrice of total final domestic production 
q = quantity of total final domestic production 
P = export price. E 
q^ = export quantity 
2 -
Pj = import price 
q = import quantity 
From (1) follows for changes in GPP with constant p 
(2) dy = p.dq - dPE-1e - Pc-dqp + ¿Pj-Qj + Pj-^t 
and for changes in income as a percentage of o.q 
(GDP ) 
,-V• , P q / dP dq \ P_ q T /dP_ dqT \ ÜZ = Él - £ £ / £ + __£ > + I, 1 i I +
 1 ¡ 
p.q q p.q i P q j p.q \ P T qT r -i u . i y £ E / \ 
Equation (3) clearly shows that a relative change in the available 
domestic income is not onlv due to a relative change in total production s 
but also to a change in the terms of trade and the amount of products exported 
or imported. The relationship between a change in the terms of trade and the 
corresponding relative change in income can easily be worked out if the 
quantities are assumed to be constant and only changes in prices are allowed 
in (3). If we further more assume an equilibrium balance of payments 
situation in the base period with P q = PTq_ and take into account that e^e I I 
export price rises lead to an improvement in the domestic income situation 
and import price rises to a deterioration, we get 
0 0 & = d Pr") 
P.q V P P T J a I / 
and as e _ _ -¡-ern,s cf trade) 
I 
we may write. 
dv P¡r qe d(tot) (5) 
Y p.q tot 
T> 0 
£ is total exports as a nercentage of GPPj this carne to 35 percent 
pq 
for the first halfof 1977 in Kenya. Tnis means that a 10 oer cent change in 
Kenya's terms of trade will lead to a 3.5 per cent change in available domestic 
income. As coffee export earnings accounted for 19.2 per cent of GDP in the 
first half of 1977, we can conclude that a 10 oer cent change in coffee prices 
will effect domestic income by 1.92 per cent. Hcwever, considering the exorbitant 
coffee price increases of the past three years (Table 2) coffee prices may change 
in the future by much more than 10 per cent. There could be a possible change 
of 50 per cent with a corresponding income change of 9.6 per cent. This 
clearly demonstrates that future coffee prices mav be far more crucial for 
the well-being of Kenya's people than the growth rate of the GDP. It is not at 
all unlikely that a considerable growth rate of GDP in the future could be 
accompanied by negativa income chances due to declining coffee prices. 
Táble 1. Valué of Kenyan coffee exportsa total exports and GDP at factor cost., 
1964 - 1977. 
Year | Coffee export Total export Coffee export GDP at factor ¡Coffee exports 
i valúe 3 unroas t ed valué valué as p.c. cost in as per cent of 
1 K£'000 K£1000 of total exp. current prices GDP 
) 
valué K£ miIlion 
i 
1964 j 15396 4-7115 32.7 330.9 . 4.7 
1965 j i 14096 47173 29.9 334.7 3.7 I 
1966 18780 53073 32.3 405.6 4.6 
1967 15676 53519 29.3 442.0 3.5 
1968 12808 57795 22.2 439.31 2.9 
1969 16837 63332 26.5 474.63 3.5 
1970 22259 71606 31.1 524.40 4.2 
1971 19530 73185 26.7 570.1 , 3.4-
1972 24769 90590 27.3 648.5 3.8 
1973 35777 122636 29.2 724.9 4.9 
197.4 38387 
1 
162946 
| 
23.6 896. 3 4-.3 
1975 35228 | 168812 20.9 1029.57 3.4 
1976 93348 | 268792 34.7 1253.36 7.4 
1977b) 127590 | 231748 55.1 664.28° 19.2 
a. Source: Statlstical Abstract and Kenya Statistical Dlgest. 
b. First haif year. 
c. Provisional. 
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Table 2 demonstrates the effect of coffee price changes on income. 
In carrying out the calculations we applied formula (5) above. However, for 
P e the weights "£•*•£ we took the mean of two periods, Th?. figures indicate that 
pq 
the effect of a change in the terms of trade on real income may be more 
important than the change in GDP at constant prices. This holds true especially 
for 1976 and the first half of 1977. 
In 1976, Kenya's economy achieved a per capita growth rate of 1.7 
per cent. However, real income per capita increased by 8.8 per cent due.to a 
favourable change in coffee prices. Even more remarkable is the figure for 
1977 which gives a 13.5 per cent change in per capita income due to the coffee 
price boom. 
Given the present domestic coffee market policy, any world market 
price change for coffee effeets the income distribution between the agricultural 
sector and the rest of the economy. A 10 per cent decline in world market 
prices for coffee would lead to an income transfer of K£ 17.425 millions in 
favour of domestic agriculture if the government were to guarantee 1977 coffee 
prices. This would account for about 5 per cent of gross farm revenue in 1977.1 
Due to high coffee prices in the past two years, Kenya has been able 
to improve her balance of payments position. In this paper we shall explore 
the effect of coffee price changes on the equilibrio exchange rate. Information 
about this relationship is very important in designing an adecúate policy 
strategy for the future. If, for example, falling coffee Drices are expected 
and consequently a depreciation of the domestic currency, present world market 
prices quoted in Kenya shillings cannot serve as a guideline for evaluating 
different policy alternatives. In particular, world market prices may be 
misleading in setting domestic agricultural product prices. 
The relationship between the rate of change of world market prices 
for coffee ( ~ ) and the necessary exchange rate adjustment is given in equation 
(6) and the proof in Appendix One. 
c ,-v dr _ da 1+e - 0.19n — - - — — — — — 
£ £ , áv where — = rate of change of the exchange rate 
= rate of change of world market prices 
3. 
S = domestic export supply elasticity 
1. Gross farm revenue from coffee for 1977 is estimated at K£'000 174,2^0 
and total gross farm revenue at Kí'OOO 362,719 (Kenya Statistlcal Djgest. Sept. 
1977). 
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n = domestic income elasticity of import demand 
^D = domestic price elasticity of import.demand. 
Equation (6) clearly shows that in the normal case with l+e^ > a negative 
change in coffee prices will result in a devaluation effect and vice versa. 
The necessary rate of adjustment due to a change in the coffee price will be 
higher 
s - the smaller the supply elasticity s 
- the smaller the price elasticity of import demand 
the smaller the income elasticity of import demand n. 
Unfortunately, no accurate valúes for the crucial parameters are 
available. However, a quantification of the relationship may be given by applying 
2 
the parameters estimated for the World Bank model of the Kenyan economy. From 
these parameters we obtain: 
eS = 0.5 
ti 
e" =- 0-.25 or - 0.5 
n = 0.36. 
Substituting these valúes in equation (6) results 
in: 
( 7 ) dr = _ 0 < 9 8 da Q r 
r a 
(8) — = - 0.74 & r a 
Equations (7) and (8) clearly indicate that coffee price changes may 
lead to an urgent need for exchange rate adjustment. Of course, the equations 
do not determine the actual exchange rate adjustment required due to a. change 
in the coffee price as other instruments may be applied to solve the balance 
of payments problem. However, the equations may clarify the crucial importance 
of future world coffee prices for Kenya's balance of payments policy. In 
summary, we may conclude that Kenya's future economic policy depends to a very 
large extent on future coffee prices. In the following section an insight in 
coffee market prospects will be given. 
PROSPECTS 0F THE WORLD COFFEE MARKET 
It is well known that Kenya's coffee is of higher quality than the 
average supply on the world market. However, due to the high elasticity of 
substitution between the different qualities of coffee, a cióse relationship 
2, World Bank, Kenya into the Second Decade, World Bank Country Economic 
Report, Baltimore, 1975, pp. 102 and 120. 
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Table 2. Coffee prices and the effect of price changes on 
domestic income. 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977S 
Price . 
KSh/ry-c 
7.31 
7.34 
6.9 
6.2 
6.8 
6.6 
8.3 
5.9 
7.8 
9.5 
10.7 
10.4 
24.1 
43.5 
~ü change 
0.4 
-6.0 
-10.5 
10.4 
-2.9 
25.4 
-16.5 
13.3 
21.2 
¡12.7 
- 2.9 
133..0 
101.6 
impact on income 
as % of GDP 
0.02 
- 0 . 2 , 
-0.4 
0.3 
-0.09 
1.0 
-0.5 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
' " Kj • 1 
7.1 
13.5 
a) Source: Kenya Statistical Idgest, 
b. First half year. 
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exists between Kenya's export prices and the average coffee price on the New 
York market. We have calculated the coefficient ,-•„ termination for Kenya's 
coffee export prices and the average price for the period 1960 to 19 76 and 
2 . found a r of 0.94, which indica tes a ver5/ cióse relationship. Consequently, 
if we want to estímate Kenya's future coffee export prices we must start with 
a prediction of the future development of the world coffee market. 
Considering the production figures first (Table 3) the annual 
fluctuations are much more important than any long-term trend. This especialiy 
2 
holds true for the period after 1960. As the coefficient of determination (r ) 
indicates a valué of 0.55 for the total period from 1947 to 1976 and of 0.002 
for 1960 to 1976, very little of the production changes can be explained by 
the trend factor. 
To generate some aggregated information about the instability of the 
time series, some instability coefficients were calculated. These are: 
(9) NSE - 1 2 
't=let 
n 
n 
(10) SW = Y, S 
t=2 
n- 1 
(11) NSES = NSE x SW 
V l6t - > 1 (12) ACC = :_0¡Max Ü T x. .,) t-2 | t> t-1 
n - 1 
where NSE = normalised standard error 
SW = switching factor 
NSES = NSE (switched) 
AAC = average annual percentage rate of change 
2 e = squared residual in period t 
n = the number of years used to construct the trend 
X = the average valué of the variable over the period 
as a whole 
S^ = 1 if the residual changes sign from t-1 to t, and 0 if the. 
residual does not change sign. 
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Table 3. World coffee production, consumption, storage, changes in storage 
and prices, 1947 - 1977. 
Year . b Production . b Consumption Storage° Changes in storage c Price 
1947 35568 , 35414 15357 154 69.9 
1948 34618 39200 15511 -4582 | 71.1 
1949 40492 41394 10929 - 902 79.3 
19 50 37615 39509 10027 -1894 111.5 
19 51 38164 39707 8133 -1543 120.0 
1952 38530 40502 6541 -1972 117.4 
1953 41513 41175 5273 338 124.0 
1954 43996 43114 5611 882 157.0 
1955 42357 37707 649 3 4650 122.9 
19 56 50348 45253 11196 5095 126.8 
19 57 45532 47179 16517 -1647 121.2 
1958 55196 46221 149 56 8975 115.3 
1959 61818 48844 23846 12974 93.0 
1960 78754 55003 36870 •23751 88.5 
1961 65694 57089 60940 8605 87.1 
1962 72058 59115 66534 12943 82.8 
1963 67404 61910 72448 5494 79.5 
1964 70998 63311 70653 7687 97.5 
1965 50613 60135 78342 -9522 97.4 
1966 81604 64300 69543 7304 96.4 i 
1967 60577 66084 87450 -5507 88.9 ! 1 
1968 68612 72885 81943 -4273 88.2 
1969 61068 70582 77670 -9814 86.3 
1970 66362 71243 67856 -4881 117.4 
1971 58291 73072 62975 -14781 109.0 
1972 71834 73946 48194 -2112 112.6 
1973 76611 78429 46082 -1818 141.6 
1974 62459 75311 44264 -12852 160.9 
1975 81082 75083 31412 5999 158.7 
1976 73645 37411 1 277.8 
| 
1977 6148 3 245.3 ! 
1978 70370 ] i 
a. Years pertain to crop years (October/September) starting with 1946/47 and 
ending in 1977/78. 
b. World production, consumption and storage figures are given in thousana bags 
of 60 kgs each. 
c. Prices are given as average spot quotations (NY.) of four types of coffee in 
US cents per pound. 
Sources: For production, consumption and prices. ' -mation was given by Prof. 
Goreux of the World Bank. For storage daca, see: Streeten and Elson, 1971, 
p. 18. 
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The indexes NSE and AAC were íntroduced by B.F. Massel (1964). 
While the NSE índex measures instability over the period of the trend taken 
as a whole, the AAC index measures annual changes withín the trend period. 
Large valúes for both indexes indi cate relatively high levels of instability. 
The switching factor SW was introduced by G.F. Soutar (1977). It is 
used to modify the NSE index to take account of the intra-period fluctuations. 
The switching factor shows how many times the variable crossed the trend 
line and henee is an indication of intra-period instability. 
In addition to these Índices, the coefficient of determination is 
presented in Table 4. A high coefficient of determination means that a large 
part of the annual changes in the variable are explainable with the help of 
the trend factor. The smaller the coefficient, the larger- are the fluctuations 
around. the trend. 
Table 4. Instability indexes of world coffee production, consumption and 
prices, 1960 - 1976. 
Index Production Consumption3 Prices 
NSE 0.12 0.03 0.27 
SW 0.59 0 '" 0.5 
NSES 0.07 0.011 0.135 
; ACC 0.13 C.032 0.16 
1 2 i r of trend 
1 
0.002 0.92 0.58 
a. For the period 1960 to 1975. 
Table 4 shows clearly that the consumption variable is the most 
stable of the three selected variables. A large part of the annual changes 
in world consumption can be explained by the long-term trend. Just the 
2 
opposite holds true for the production figures. An R of 0.002 indicates 
that only 0.2 per cent of the variations in production are due to the trend 
factor. This implies a high instability which is also supported by all other 
instability indexes. As a consequence of a relatively stable consumption 
trend and a relatively unstable pattem of production, world market prices 
also show a high degree of instability. The main cuestión to be answered 
is whether the instability of production and prices can be explained in 
economic terms and, above all, whether accurate forecasts can be made. 
10 -
It is extremely difficult te explain the variation in coffee production 
over time for a number of reasons. The production time series contains four 
distinctive components: 
1. A two-year eyele (see for example B.E. Rourke, 1970, R. Edwards 1977 
and R. Edwards and A. Parikh, 1976) 
2. A long-term eyele of anproximately twenty years 
3. A long-term trend factor indicating changes in the comparative 
advantages of coffee production 
4. A random element due to weather factors. 
Unfortunately, the weather factor very often overlaps with all the 
other factors. Thus, it is nearly iirpossible to make accurate forecasts of 
world production. One additional factor makes the predictión of world prices 
even more difficult, which is that annual fluctuations in prices are less 
determined by discrepancias between current production and current demand than 
by the storage policies of exporting and .importing nations. This can easily 
be verified by the data given in Table 3. There are periods of nearly stable 
prices with broad fluctuations in production and consumption. A major price 
change will only occur if there is a continuous increase or decrease in stocks 
over some years. From 19 61 to 19 69, annual production was greater than annual 
consumption. Henee, prices were fairly stable ai"1'-'• independently of current 
production. As stocks were released from 1967 on, market prices reacted much 
more sensitively to production fluctuations. Yet even the large production 
déficits in 1974, 1977 and possiblv in 1973 could have been completely 
compensated by a release of stocks which would have held market prices constant. 
This clearly shows the importance of storage policies in determining market 
prices. However, it seems impossible to predict storage policies accurately. 
Policy activities in this area are fairly discretionary and are very much 
influenced by expectations about the future development of the market. 
The main holders of coffee stocks are Brazil, as the principal exporter, 
and the U.S. as the principal importer. The storage policy of these two 
countries may be seen as the most crucial factor in determining short-term 
price variations. Only if Kenya were to have some influence on or at least 
insight into the storage policies of these countries, could the accuracy 
of short-term domestic planning data be improved. This problem will be 
mentioned below in the discussion of an international buffer stock for coffee. 
The quantification of the other components in the time series of 
production is not as difficult. There are reliable estimations of supply and 
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demand elasticity at hand (S. Singh, J. de Vries, J.C.L. Hulley, and P. Yeung, 
1977;, R. Edwards and A. Parikh 1976). However3 i7" -•"•;ng the estimated magn'tudes 
of supply and demand elasticities for projection purposes it must be remembered 
that market prices are not equal to nroducer prices, as some countries impose 
export levies (H.J. Stuckmeyer, 1977) which can be progressive. 
Projections of world supply and demand for coffee have been made by 
a world bank team (S. Sinph et al. .1977). Their figures are presented in 
Table 5. 
Table 5. Projections of world coffee production and consumption 
-
Year Production Consumption 
(million bags) (million bags) 
1979 84.7 80.6 
1980 88.2 83.9 
1981 90.3 36.7 
1982 94.4 89.4 
1983 99.1 92.4 
1934 103.8 3 ~ o. 
1985 107.5 99 .6 
1986 107.9 103.0 
1991 107.9' 111.6 
Source: S. Singh et al. (19 77) p. 44. 
Of course these forecasts cannot take into consideration annual 
changes in weather conditions. However,.they estimate the most likely level 
of production and consumption for the coming years. In -pito of vh Z -„rgs 
production déficit in the period from 1976 to 1978, production will most 
probably surpass consumption in all the years for which forecasts have been 
made. Of course this will not necessarily lead to an immediate drop in prices 
as there may be some building up of stocks for a period of time. However, 
it should be noted that there will be a strong tendency for prices to fall 
in the years ahead. According to the forecast of the World Bank, real coffee 
o 
prices will be about the same in the early 1980s as they were in the first 
years of the 1970s. In making these projections, supply and demand fluctuations 
were estimated from historical data. However, as it seems there has been a 
remarkable shift in consumer taste away from coitee in favcur of tea. it may 
happen that even the prices predicted will be too high to equate supply and demand. 
The price projection?, therefore, may be quite optimistic from the producers' 
point of view. 
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As the prospects for the world coffee market do not look favourable 
from the Kenyan point of view, we shall explore +r " --oss Lbilities for inter-
national arrangements which might mitigate the economic problems arising 
from market conditions. 
KENYA'S INTEREST IN AN INTERNATIONAL COFFEE MARKET STABILISATION SCHEME 
As the world coffee market is very volatile and at the same time 
very important for some less developed countries,, there is an obvious need 
for some international stabilisation scheme. In the following section we shall 
discuss the role of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), the possibilities 
for an international buffer stock for coffee which is at the moment the subject 
of official discussion, and the Stabex-system. 
The International Coffee Agreement 
The international Coffee Agreement, including major importers as 
well as exporters, was signed in 1962. The last agreement was settled in 
December 1975, came into effect 1 October 1976, and is supposed to cover 
a period of six years. The chief objective of this Agreement was and is 
price support, rather than price stabilisation (P.Streeten and D. Elson, 1971, 
p.20). This can only be achieved by imposing quotas on expox'Ls t.. craditional 
markets in North America and Western Europe, the so-called Annex A countries. 
Exports to new markets, the so-called Annex B co-m ries, chiefly in Eastern 
Europe and the underdeveloped countries, are free from quotas. The main out-
line of the Agreement has not changed through the three negotiations which have 
taken place up to now. The only new introduction was a revisión of the basic 
quotas which are assigned to each country and the grouping of the importing 
countries under Annex A and Annex B. 
It follows,from the objectives of the Agreement that it is mainly in 
favour of exporting, rather than importing nations. If. nevertheless, the 
importing nations jo.ined in the Agreement — and indeed the ir active support 
of the Agreement is essential for its viábility — this may be seen as the 
result of successful negotiations carried out by the exporting nations and 
good will on the part of the importing nations, whc accepted the Agreement as 
a form of international aid. 
The need for a producers' agreement on the world coffee market 5-= 
cbvious if one considers whether an individual producer could raise its revenue 
by restricting supply unilaterally. The answer can be £Íven with the help of 
the following formula (for the proof see Appendix Two):-
- 13 - IDS/WP 333 
n 3 u • q s e - Jn . e — n q 
s 
h q 
price elasticity of demand facing country 1 
price elasticity of world market demand 
t>rice elasticity of supply of all countries other than 1 
total world market supply 
world market supply of country 1 
world market supply of all countries other than 1. 
According to equation (13) the relationship between a one percentage 
change in the supply of country 1 ( — d e p e n d s on world demand elasticity, the 
£1 
supply elasticities of all other competing suppliers and the market shares. 
i Di It is well known that only with e | < 1 could a country increase its revenue 1 • •• • 
by restricting supply. However, such a situation only pertains if the individual 
market share is larger than je |. The difference between the market share and 
the price elasticity of demand will be higher the greater the supply elasticity 
of the competing suppliers. 
The price elasticity of world market demand at the pre-boom price level 
is around -0.2 (see S. Singh et al., 1977, p.33). Brazil is the only country with 
a market share ab.ove 0.2, namely about 0.3. However, even this large market share 
would not allow Brazil to manipúlate prices upwards. According to the estimates 
of supply elasticities carried out by a World Bank team, such a policy could only 
Table 6. Price elasticities of coffee supply by regions. 
Región or Country Elasticity of supply with respect to.price 
short temí. long term long term 
j v r " *r (lag 1 year) (lag 7 years) full adoption 
Brazil 0.20 0.44 0.66 
Colombia 0.03 0.18 0.40 
Other South America 0.06 0.46 10.70 
America & Carribbean 0.03 0.14 0.77 
Africa 0.12 0.44 1.87 
Asia 0.10 0.43 3.01 
Source: S. Singh et al. (1977) p.31. « 
(13) , 
£1 
where e^ 
D e 
s e n 
s q 
s 
<li A1 
O 
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have a limited effect. A necessary condition for the success of such a policy 
is a supply elasticity of competing suppliers belcw C. 14, which may only hold 
true in the short run. 
Facing a world market price elasticity of aemand far below 1, it is 
not surprising that all coffee producing nations are interested in restricting 
supply. Clearly, by doing this total revenue may be increased. However, this 
may not necessarily be true in the case of an individual country. This depends 
completely on the distribution of quotas, and henee the national supply 
restriction, as well as the rise in world market prices. Fór an evaluation of 
these effeets see Appendix Three. . 
Up to now national quotas have corresponded to past export levels. 
However, such a procedure favours large and mature producer countries (Gwyer, 
1972, p.467), as opposed to countries whose industries are immature and just 
embarking on a period of rapid growth. The costs to the producer nations of 
restricting supplies is distribuíed quite arbitrarily, as the different 
national opportunity costs of restricting national supplies are not taken 
into account. Those countries which have already achieved an optimal level 
of domestic production do not have to bear any costs with the establishment 
of the quota system. 
The newer coffee producing nations, such as Kenya, which are still 
expanding production should oppose the present quota system, as should the 
importing nations. We stated above that the coffee importing nations obviously 
accept the International Coffee Agreement as a vehicle for foreign aid. However, 
this does not say that this form of agreement is seen as the most efficient 
possible. As the production pattern of the past is frozen, coffee is not 
produced with minimai average cost. The less developed countries would 
receive a higher net transfer of aid via the Agreement if they were to allow 
a-change in the production pattern in favour of the most efficient producérs. 
As a cartel in an industry normally results in the closing of the least efficient 
firms and a.pooling of profit, the same should hold true for the ICA. As it 
seems quite unrealistic to expect to find a quota system with which all-
countries will be equally satisfied, a tendeney to break the rules of the' 
agreement will be a permanent danger, especially in periods of declining 
world market prices. This is testified by the breakdown of the agreement in 
1972 (Wassermann, 1973). A modification of the present quota system should 
be advocated which could be along the lines presented here. 
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Starting with national quotas based on past production performance, 
an international trade of quota certificates among nroducing nations should be 
allowed. To make sure that certificates go from less efficient to more efficient 
producers, the transfer should be agreed upon by the International Coffee Board. 
As criteria for evaluating the efficiency of production, the Board could 
consider the relationship between domestic and world coffee prices and the 
willingness of the individual producers of the country buying the certifícate 
to expand production. This implies that coffee producing nations would restrict 
domestic supply by imposing in export tax on coffee. If, for example, the export 
tax is relatively high and nevertheless the country tends to fill its initial 
quota, this indicates that the country is a low-cost coffee producer. It will 
be shown below that a domestic restriction of supply via an export tax on coffee 
may be very desirable from the national point of view. 
A comparison of the present and the revised quota system will be 
drawn. Let us assume that the marginal cost curves for coffee production in 
two countries are shaped as indicated in Figure 1. It is assumed- that in the 
A " B past we had the supply curve of country A and S( of country B. As country 
A is assumed to be a new coffee producer, it only produces the quantity a with el 
market prices P^. Country B, however, has a mature coffee industry and produces 
an optimal quantity q^ with given market Drices p^. Country A would like to 
expand coffee production up to q^ in the future, evrn with given prices and 
given opportunity costs. 
Now, assume that a quota system is introduced. A constant level of 
production would allow for a price increase up to Pq due to the upward shift in 
the demand curve. The two countries may decide to accept past production 
performance as the basis for national quotas. This would result in the following 
situation, as compared with a non-quota systems. 
Figure 1.' The Quota System and National Gains 
Country A _ Country B 
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-Country A would gain an amount, of income equal to ABCD and would 
lose EFB. If there viere a downward shift of the supply curve due to a change 
in opportunity costs , the loss component could be e-von higher, in the figure 
GHB. This clearly shows that new producer countries may lose from a quota 
system if national quotas correspond to past production performance and if the 
national pattern of production performance in the past was suboptimal. The 
situation of country B, however, is favourable. Due to the quota system, an 
additional income of A' B' C* D', or of A' E? C' G' D' in the case of an upward 
shift of the supply curve, is earned. 
Due to the divergence in national benefits, the national shadow prices 
for an additional quota of one unit differ. If country A could increase the 
amount of production by one unit, the additional income would be equal to the 
area GIJC which is equal to the shadow nrice of the quota. If, however, country 
B were to lose one unit of quota the income forgone would be equal to the area 
F'G'C". This clearly shows that the allocation of quotas is suboptimal. Total 
costs of producing nations could be decreased by a reallocation of quotas. This 
would contribute to an increase in the net aid received from importing nations. 
This comparison holds true for the present quota system. The intro-
duction of tradeable quota certificates, however, might allow a change in the 
production pattern, thus mitigating the most serious disadvantage of the present 
quota system which lies in the freezing of the production pattern to the dis-
advantage of immature coffee producer nations. Of course, this does not say 
that the problems arising from the distribution of the original national quotas 
will be abolished. However, the disadvantages of poorly allocated quotas will 
be smaller. 
It may be interesting to give some idea of the price a country might 
pay for one additional unit of quota. The price may be calculated with the 
help of the formula below. A simple proof is given in Appendix Four. 
(14) p - ^--t,£ (i ) 1 (p _ v ) K ' B r ,, .5 ' 2 " P (1 + r) .. 
where P = the quota price o 
r = the rate of discount 
Pp = the export price 
Pp = the producer price + marketing margin. 
For a rate of discount of 0.1, equation (14) can be transformed to (15). 
(15) P R = 2.08 (PE - P p) 
As the difference between P and P is determined by the export tax, we can ili 1 
write 
(16) P^ = 2.08 (1 - a) P_ O b 1 
where 1 - a is the export tax as a percentage of P_, 
For 1 - a = 0.15 as in Kenya, (16) results in 
(17) P B = 0.3 P E 
For countries which were only just able to fill their allocated quotas at the 
present price level, the price they would be willing to pay for additional 
units of quota would be zero. They should asell quota shares at any price 
above zero. 
Up to now we discussed the International Coffee Agreement as a means 
of price support. Whilst this is the chief objective, the Agreement tries to 
stabilise the market as well. It is of great interest from the Kenyan point 
of view whether the Agreement will fulfill this stabilising function in the 
near future. 
The most recent Agreement provides for the introduction of export 
quotas if the price level of 1975 cannot be maintained otherwise (Singh et al., 
1977, p.4-8). However, it is very unlikely that market nrices will fall below 
this level in the near future (one to two years). Indeed, a large drop in 
prices from the 1977 level would be possible witho'jc bringing the ICA into 
function. As there is widespread awareness that the ICA does more aim to 
support prices than to stabilise them, and may not even be a suitable agreement 
for the purpose of stabilising prices, an international buffer stock for coffee 
is under discussion. In the following section we try to analyse effects of an 
international buffer stock from Kenya's point of view. 
Kenya's Interest in an International Buffer Stock for Coffee. 
The following questions will be discussed: 
(a) Will stabilisation of world market prices stabilise Kenya's export 
earnings as well? 
(b) How will the stabilisation of world market prices affect the size of 
Kenya's export earnings over. time? 
(c) What indicators could serve, as criteria for a country's willingness 
to pay for the functions of the international scheme? 
In answering the first cuestión we have to compare the fluctuations 
in export earnings with an international buffer stock and without one. If the • 
buffer stock succeeds in stabilising world market prices, flucxucn.Xw.ia ¿a 
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domestic export earnings are given by 
dR. da. (18) i _ i 
R. ~ a. i i 
where R_. = export earnings of country i 
da. = 
— — = the autonomous suoply fluctuation caused by weather a. 7 " 
conditions in country i 
Under free market conditions exnort earnings would fluctuate as given in 
(19) (For proof see Appendix Five). 
/ x dR. , 1 + ES. da. (19) i _ _ da x i 
R. a s D a. 
i e - e i 
da where — = autonomous supply fluctuation on the world market caused a 
by weather conditions 
5 
e^ = price elasticity of supply in country i 
^s = price elasticity of supply on the world market 
D = , nrice elasticity of demand on the world market. 
£ 
Whether an internaticnal buffer stock for coffee will lead to the stabilisation 
of Kenya's coffee export earnings depends on the following relation: 3 dq. , 1 + e. da. (20) .i > da i i q. < a s - D a. 
• i E £ i 
If the left hand side is greater than the right hana side no stabilisation 
effect will occur. However, this will never happen if fluctuations on the da world market and domestic fluctuations are inversely correlated. If — > 0 
da a < and also i > 0 a necessary condition for a stabilisation effect is:-
ai < s , 1 + £. da. 
(ai) 
E £ 1 
As the variance for world production is considerably higher than the varianee 
for Kenyan coffee production (see bslow for the data), it may be concluded that 
1 + -S 
> — T h e maenitude of the coefficient "i may be checked with the 
a ai " s - D E e T) 
data presented in Table 6 for supply elasticities and for e = - 0.2. This 
results in a valué much greater than 1, clearly leading to the conclusión that 
an international buffer stock for coffee will help to stabilize Kenya's coffee 
export earnings. 
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A similar definite statement can be given to the second question 
raised above: It is very likely that the Kenya's coffee export earnings over 
time will be higher with a buffer stock than without one. This conclusión 
can be proved by two lines of argument. First, it is well-known that coffee 
producers do not receive the full price which coffee ccnsumers have to pay. 
However, the marketing margin as a difference between the consumers' expendi-
ture and the producers' revenue is sensitive to producer nrice fluctuations. 
Normally, the margin goes up if producer prices fall, and vice versa. A 
proof for this statement is given in Appendix Six. 
As rises in producer prices are passed on to the consumer more quickly 
than declines in producer prices, fluctuating in producer prices result in a 
higher marketing margin. By stabilising prices the margin could be decreased 
and henee the earnings of exporting nations would be increased over time as a 
percentage of consumer expenditure. 
This argument is in line with the development of wholesale, retail 
and dock prices since April 1977 (see Figure 2). Dock prices have been 
declining sharpljr since April 19 77 and a small price fall at the wholesale 
and retail level first appeared in June/July 1977. 
Figure 2: Development of coffee prices at different levels of the. marketing 
channel. 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics and International Coffee Organisation, 
quoted in Newsweek, Noverriber 1^77> p.43. 
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A second reason why an International buffer stock should increase 
Kenya's coffee export earnings over time can be given by comparing the 
relative changes in export earnings with fluctuating qaantities and prices 
(Koester, 1978). This leads to the conclusión that for normally behaved 
supply and demand functions, the negative percentage change in revenue with 
declining prices will be greater than the positive percentage change in revenue 
with increased prices, Henee the average revenue would be higher with 
stabilised prices. 
The viability of any international organisation depends to a large 
extent on the willingness of member countries to make financial contributions. 
For this reason the distribution of financial obligations should be worked out 
very carefullv. It seems most reasonable to formúlate a ratio of distribution 
which the national contributions correspond closely to the national benefits. 
However, it may be difficult to derive generally acceptable criteria for 
evaluating national benefits. We propose that those countries stand to gain 
the most from an international buffer stock whose production caused the most 
the fluctuations in quantity of coffee on the world market. 
B.E. Rourke (1970), following Feller's proposal, tried to break down 
the total variance in world coffee production to the variance of component 
parts. The following equation is postulated for totál variance (Rourke-, 1970, 
p. 19 8): -
n 2 y (22) Var (S ) = E o, + 2 . . Cov (X. X, ) 
n k = l k 35 
2 2 where X. ..., X = random variables with finite variances a, ...o j> n 1, n 
S = X + . . . + X n .1 n 
The last sum of (22) extends over each of the 
pairs (X_. X^) with j < k, 
Instead of (22) we may write: n 
E 2 E Cov(X. X ) 
(23) 1 = k^lCTk + 2 j,k k 
Var(S ) Var (S ) n n 
2 
The term __k may be takcn as the direct contribution of individual com-
Var (S ) 
n ( X X ) ponents to total variance, whilst the term 2ECov '"k may be taken as the 
Var (S ) n 
contribution of the interaction of a pair of components to total variability 
(Rourke, 1970, p. 199). 
- 21 - IDS/WP 333 
Rourke carried out calculations for the perded 1946/47 to 1966/67 
and found that Brazil contributed 86 Der cent to the total fluctuation in 
world- production. We calculated the direct contr .i. .tion of Brazil and Kenya 
to fluctuations in world production and found valúes of 73 per cent for 
Brazil and 0.4 per cent for Kenya for the past 8 years. These figures, however, 
do not indicate that Brazil should pay 73 per cent and Kenya 0.4 per cent -of' 
the funds needed to finance an international buffer stock. If the importing 
nations also contribute money to help finance the buffer stock then Kenya 
should only pay 0.4 per cent of the total amount paid by exporting nations. 
Up to now, there is no general agreement on the organisation of an 
international buffer stock for coffee. Thus it is doubtful whether Kenya1s 
coffee export earnings will be stabilised in this way in the near future. 
Therefore, we must ask whether Kenya may expect some benefit from the stábex 
system. 
The Importance of the Stribex System 
The Stabe'x System is a system for stabilising export earnings of 
ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific) produets (for details see FES, 1976). As 
Kenya is one of the ACP countries and coffee is a product which is covered we 
may ask whether this agreement can provide a stabilisation of Kenya's coffee 
export earnings. 
A country may ask for a financial transfer from the European Economic 
Community if the export earnings from a certain product, i.e. coffee, account 
for at least 7.5 per cent of the total valué of that country's exports and if 
the earnings from exports to the Community (general case) or to all other 
countries (special case) of the product considered falls at least 7.5 per cent 
below the reference level. The reference level is equal to the average export 
earnings obtained during the four years preceding the year of applicatión. The 
difference between the reference level and the actual earnings constitutes the 
basis for the transfer of funds. ^he amount trarsferred does not carry any 
interest rate and should be repaid within five years. However, repayments are 
only necessary if the unit valué of the exports rises higher than the reference 
unit valué and the quantity actually exported to the Community is at least equal 
to the quantity of reference. 
It is very likely that Kenya-'s actual export earnings from coffee in 
1978 will be lower than the average for the preceding four years. Indeed, 
this may even be true for the years 1978 to 1981, as the reference level is 
influenced by the extremely high export earnings in 1976 and 1977. Furthermore, 
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it is quite probably-that .during the five years after the first financial 
transfer in favour of Kenya, the conditions will r ••'- be inet for a repayment 
of the loan. This means that Kenya has a good chance of getting a loan from 
the European Economic Community, and this may turn out to be the most effective 
way to cooe with the problem of falling coffee export earnings. However, the 
Community only makes these loans if resources are available and it is possible 
that other coffee exporting countries, will apply for loans from the same límited 
resources. 
CONSEQUENCES FOR KENYA'S COFFEE MARKET POLICY 
Recommendations for improvements in Kenya's coffee market policy will 
be outlined in this section, but first a short appraisal of Kenya's past coffee 
market policy will be made. Up until 17 June 1977, Kenya did not have an export 
tax on coffee (see USDA, 1977, p.4)„ At that time the government imposed a tax 
on all coffee sold at the Nairobi coffee auction at a rate of 15 per cent of the 
sale price above K£ 1000 per metric ton. On coffee sold for export, but not at 
the Nairobi auction, the duty is K£ 300 per ton or 10 per eent of the f.o.b. valué, 
which ever is greater. Because there was no export tax until the middle of 1977, 
average gross on-farm. prices for coffee went up from Shs 778/92 per 100 kg in 1972 
to Shs 4,100/00 per 100 kg in the first and second quarter of 1977. This 
means that farm prices increased by 52b per cent w:'thin this period (see Kenya 
Statistical Dlpest, Septeniber 1977, p.18) and coffee producers received a high 
windfall profit. It may be questioned whether such a large coffee price 
increase was beneficial from the macroeconomic and social point of view. 
The coffee pricing policy in the past allowed coffee producers an 
increase in 'revenue of i<£ 260.372 million within the period from 1972 to 1977 
(Kenya Statistical Digest, September 1977, p.17). The 1976 revenue was about 
three times as much as the 1975 revenue, and 1977 brought a further increase 
of about 70 per cent over 1976. This developmept went against some important 
social and economic objectives. It is well known, for example, that coffee is 
only produced in certain areas and that the present structure of production has 
been very much influenced by a governmental ban on new planting in the past 
(Westlake, 1973, p.l). Oíd. established coffee producers were already favoured 
by the restriction on new planting in the period prior to 1972. Coffee producers 
on average are among .the relatively well-off farmers. Henee the exorbitant 
coffee price increases obviously clgclÍnS"t "til6' Oh[] ¿Ctl ivo of a more, equitably 
distribution of income within agriculturé. In other words, market forces worked 
against the achievement of the postulated income distribution objective. 
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It is even possibie that the consequences of past policy will be to 
increase poverty in the rural areas in the future. It is well known that 
Kenya's coffee industry has up to now been very l&üour intensive as conroared 
to that of other countries (Srnith and Brown, 19 74), but this may change as a 
consequence of the large price increase, the large gain in liquidity, higher 
wage rates and a process of substituting capital for labour. If this hapoens 
future employment objectives will be difficult to obtain due to past coffee 
market policies. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the high price increase for 
coffee has contributed to the overall rate of inflation, thus violating the 
objective of monetary stábility. Needless to say9 in the past a high rate of 
inflation has worked to lower the living standards of the unemployed and the 
working poor. As the salaries for civil servants have not been able to keep 
up with the salary increases outside the government sector, not only are the 
conditions for poorly paid civil servants worsened, but also the quality of 
the personnel decreases, 
It might be argued that all these disadvantages are justified in 
light of the high overall economic growth rate from coffee earnings, but this 
does not seem to be correct. If we accept the marginal capital output ratio 
applied by the "orld Bank team for the Kenyan econorw which was 0.97 for agri-
culture-oriented growth (World Bank, 1975, p.137), . .• growth rate of GDP at 
constant 1972 prices should have been about 7 per cent during 1977, given 
proper investment of the coffee windfall gains. As the actual growth rate 
which should have been much higher than 7 per cent was actually lower (about 
6 per cent), this implies the inadeauate allocation of additional coffee earnings 
in the past. 
As a consequence of the shortcomings of past Kenyan coffee market 
policy, it is proposed to stabilise producers' revenue froir coffee by imposing 
an export tax. This tax should aim at stabilising that producer price which 
guarantees the fulfilment of the national quota. Thus the tax would be variable 
as export prices are variable. Any possibie windfall gain or loss would be 
given to the society as a whole, and not only to one small, relatively well-off 
part of the community. This export tax for coffee could help improve Kenya's 
bargaining power in renegotiating new quotas. Kenya should try to introduce 
tradeable certificates for quotas on an international level. Kenya should also 
support the initiation of an international buffer stock, but should insist on 
making only a marginal financial contribution. 
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APPENDIX ONE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COFFEE PRICE CHANGES AND EXCHANGE 
RATE ADJUSTHENT 
The analysis starts with the definiticn of the balance of goods and 
services. We have: . 
(1) B = PE qE - PT qj 
where B = balance 
P = export price ¿j 
q - export quantity l ili 
P = import price 
q^ . - import quantity. 
From (1) we get for changes in B:-
(2.) dB = dpE q E .+ PE-dqE - dp]. ^  - Pj-d^ . 
It is hypothesised that dB ought to be zero' and in the initial period 
the valué of exports is equal to the valué of imports, i.e. :-
(3) dB = 0 
(4) P E q£ = ' P l qT 
Therefore, we get from (2) 
(5) ^ E ^ f l ^ 
. % ? ! + % 
Equation (5) states that the rate of change of the export valué ought 
to be equal to the rate of change of the import valué if there is not to be an 
additional strain on foreign currency holdings. Domestic export prices may change 
due to an autonomous change in vrorld coffee market prices and an adjustment of 
the exchange rate, while import prices are assumed to change only with the 
adjustment of the exchange rate. 
Therefore, we obtain:-
d?E da | dr 
V ¡ a w ' a r '' where — = the rate of change of world coffee prices 
a = coffee export valué as a percentaje of total export earnings 
. which was 0.55 in 1977 
dr — - the rate of change of the exchange rate.. 
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Equation (6) can only hold true if world market demand for Kenya's 
export product? is complete ly price elastic. This ^av b^ a. realistic assumption 
for a small country such as Kenya, 
For changes in import prices, we postúlate:-
(7) dr 
PI * ^ 
Again, equation (7) is based on the small-country assumption. 
Due to autonomous and manipúlated changes in export and import prices, 
there will be changes in export and import quantities as well. These changes 
are determined by the following equations:-
(8) dqE s dPE 
~ = " * X E E 
3 where e = price elasticity of domestic export supply 
(9) D dPI dy - F . 4- TI «£-e — + n. 
pi y 
j * where e" .= price elasticity of domestic import demand 
rj = income elasticity of domestic import demand 
dy 
—^ = rate of change m domestic meóme due to a one per cent 
change in world coffee market Drices. 
Whilst equation (8) states that export quantities only change due 
to export price changes, equation (9) takes into consideration that coffee 
price changes have a direct effect on domestic income and henee on import 
demand, In the text we showed the relationship between coffee price changes 
and domestic income. 
We obtained:-
(10) & = 0.19. — y a 
Solving this set of equations we get:-
(11) ^ = -0.55 ^  . -1+gS " °'iqn r a s - D •e e 
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APPENDIX TOO: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FACING 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND THE TOTAL MARKET DEMAND 
The notation is:-5 
q' = total market supply 
S q = market supply of country 1 
S q = market supply of all countries other than 1 n 
D q = total market demand 
e^ = price elasticity of total market demand g 
e = price elasticity of supply of all countries other than 1 n _ 
= price elasticity of demand facing country 1. 
For total market supply the following equation holds 
(1) s S L s q = qx + q n 
From (1) follows:-
(2) d £ = ^ . dq^ + ^ # dc£ 
q S S S S 
The market clearance condition is:-
(3) dqS _ dqD 
S " D-
q q 
From (2) and (3), and taking into account the definitions for the relevant 
elasticities, we obtain:-
S D S 
(4) e = q-l £1 . sS —c • S n S qn q 
This results for e'^  in:-
(5) D qnS S £ - . £n 
e
D = J L i s q^ 
q 
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APPENDIX THREE: ÍHE QUOTA SYSTEM EVALUATED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AN 
IMMATUEE COFFEE PRODUCING NATION 
M 
/ 
i i 
! 
-E«) , 
igc 
—«¿áSL. ^ 
qa q' 
A quota system is favourable from the national point of view of an immature 
coffee producing nations if the loss (1^) BED is smaller than the gain (g^) 
ABCD. For the gain we may write: 
(1) g. D " 
dZq? 
where g^ = gain of country i 
q. = present production of country i 
P = present world market price 
e" = price elasticity of world market 
= percentage restriction of world market supply due to the 
dzq? 
"i quota system. 
For the loss we may write 
(2) 1. = i . dq.(p-mc) i ~ i 
where = loss of country i 
dq. = potential production increase of country i 
me = marginal cost of country i. 
If we write P - r and take inte account the definition of the domestic 
me 
supply elasticity e^ 
we derive from (2):-
(3) 1. = 0.5 p (1 - -) . eS. q. (r - 1) i r i i 
A country would be indifferent to a quota system if the gain were equal to 
the loss. If we set equation (1) and (3) equal, we obtain:-
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ZqS 
(4) q. o ——r- - Gv5 p (1 - h . e!.q. (r - 1) i * D „ s - r e Zq. 
or 
(5) d Zql ± s 
i = s « 0.5 (1 - -) £. • (r - 1) „ s r i Zq. - i 
Equation (5) allcws us to calcúlate the necessary restriction in world market 
supply to compénsate for the national loss due to the agreement. 
If we make the following optimistic assumptions for Kenya:-
E = - 0 . 2 
s 
e = 0 . 5 
r = 1.3 
this results in 
i- = 0.003 
r s Zq. 
If present prices were 30 per cent above marginal cost and the domestic 
supply elasticity were 0.5, the quota system would be favourable from the 
national point of view if the restriction in world market supply is greater 
than 0.3 per cent. This clearly shows that from Kenya's noint of view the 
quota system is most likely to be favourable. 
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APPENDIX FOUR: CALCÜLATION OF THE QUOTA PRICE 
It is assumed that domestic production in restricted by imposing 
an export tax. The method of calculation will be clarified with the help 
of the following graph. 
Price /S / 
C B . 
- _. ---y, 
í ./ i 
A !/"" t 
quántity 
With the given domestic supply curve and the given national quota q^ the 
domestic producer price has to be p^ whilst the export price is p^. The 
country under consideration would like to expand production to q^. By doing 
this an additional income of ABC could be earned. The country would be 
willing to Day for an increase in its quota up to the amount of income earned 
per additional unit of production, The total additional income ABC in one 
period could be: 
(1) Ay = i (PE - F p) Aq 
where Ay = total additional income in one neriod 
P = export price ÍL> 
Pp = producer price 
Aq = nroduction increase wanted. 
From (1) we derive the additional income per unit of production 
increase:-
Ay _ (2) Aq i (PF " P») Hi i. 
Equation (2) gives the additional income which could be earned in all coming 
periods. The quota price the country would be willing to pay is equal to 
the present valué of additional future income. Henee the time horizon is of 
some importance; as the quota system is renewed every six years a time 
horizon of four to five years seems to be reasonable. Therefore3 we get for 
the quota price:-
(3) P 1 + r B (1 (1 + rV 
price 
rate of discount 
i (PE " Pp> 
where P„ = the cuota B 
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As it is assumed that. ..th.e difference between the export and producer 
price is given by the export tax, we may write:-
(4) PR = l_i_r ( 1 _ _ 1 } . i ( 1 . a ) p 
(1+r) E 
where 1 - a = the export tax as percentage of F^. 
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APPENDIX FIVE: COMPARISQN OF EXPORT EARNINQ FLUCTUATIONS WITH AND WITHOUT 
AN INTERNATIONAL BIJFFEP. STOCK 
We start with the definition for export earnings of country i:-
(1) R. = qS . P i i 
where R^ = export earnings of country i g 
q^ = export supply of country i 
P = export price = world market Drice. 
Furthermore, we hypothise:-
(2) q? = qS (P, a.) 
(3) qS = qS (P, a) 
(4) q D = qD (P) 
S where a = world market supply 
a^ = autonomous change in supply of country i 
a = autonomous change in world market supply 
D 
q = world market demand. 
Solving this set of equations results in:-
(5) dR. , , S i da 1+e. da. — — = - — i + i 
i S D a. s -e i 
S where e^ = price elasticity of supply in country i g 
e = price elasticity of supply on the world market 
= price elasticity of demand on the world market. 
Equation (5) gives information about the fluctuation of export 
earnings under free market conditions. To derive an expression for the 
fluctuation of export earnings with a stabilised market, we start from the 
following set of equations 
(6) R. - P . QS i "'i 
(7) qS. = qS. (a) i "i 
(8) P = 
dR. The solution to this set of equations with respect to i is:-
R. i 
S dR. dq. - 1
R. S i q,. 
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APPENDIX SIX: • THE RELEVAN CE OF FLUCTUATING PRODUCER PRICES FOR THE SIZE OF 
THE MARKETING MARGIN 
It is assumed that coffee is sold in an oligopolistic market which 
allows us to consider prices or quantities as policy parameters. We shall 
show the consumer Drices set by marketing firms based on varying producer 
prices. 
We start with the following equation of definition:-
(1) = q--m 
where R^ = net revenue 
q = quantity bought and sold 
m - marketing margin per unit. 
Assume that the marketing firm wishes to maximise profit, this includes 
maximising net revenue with invariant costs. To derive the conditions for 
maximisation, we have to differentiate (1) with respect to q. This results 
in:-
(2) d V _ + . — j — = m + q dm dq ^ - 3 — dq 
As a change in the margin m implies the same change in the consumer price, with 
given producer prices, we can write:-
(3) dm = dP c 
where P = consumer price. c 
Equation (3) inverted into (2) gives: 
(4) dP c _ _ m 
dq ' P P ^ c c 
or 
p (5) e = _c 
m 
where e = consumer price elasticity of demand. 
Equation (5) gives tha condition for profit maximisation. The 
relationship between consumer price and margin per unit should be equal to 
the price elasticity of demand at the consumer level. As it is well-known 
that the ábsolute, magnitude of the price elasticity declines with falling 
prices, equation (5) implies that the margin will be higher with lower 
producer and consumer price levels. This may help to explain the dowrarard 
rigidity of consumer prices. 
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